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# SOVIET SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

A Report of the Deployment Working Group

of the

GUIDED MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE



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#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

The Deployment Working Group of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) wishes to acknowledge the support of the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center in providing facilities for meetings and working sessions, and for assistance in editing, illustrating, and publishing of this report. The Working Group also wishes to acknowledge the support and assistance provided by the photographic intelligence personnel of Army, Navy, and CIA.





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NOTE: All correspondence relative to this report should be directed to the Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC).



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#### INTRODUCTION

The specific objective of the GMAIC Deployment Working Group (DWG) has been to provide a detailed review and analysis of all data pertinent to the location of medium- and long-range ballistic missile sites.

This report has been prepared to assist GMAIC in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to USIB on surface-to-surface missile deployment. It specifically addresses itself to the problem of ballistic missile launch site locations within the Soviet Union, and provides an updating of those sections of the 4 April 1960 report of the GMAIC Ad Hoc Deployment Working Group pertaining to this subject.

The Deployment Working Group reviewed information on suspect launch sites as follows:

- 1. Re-evaluated those locations covered in detail by the Ad Hoc Deployment Working Group.
- 2. Examined in detail all suspect site locations listed by the Ad Hoc Deployment Working Group which were not evaluated in their report.
- 3. Examined in detail and evaluated additional suspect locations as suggested by the members of the DWG.

The locations included in this report are those which have been reported in various source materials as operational surface-to-surface ballistic missile launch sites or areas, as well as those which, on the basis of reported information, might conceivably have this function. In the case of some of the listed locations, there is insufficient information to firmly determine the type of site or missile system involved. It is possible, therefore, that some of the locations included in this report may actually represent other missile systems such as surface-to-air (SAM), short-range SSM (less than 700 nm), cruise-type, or perhaps test facilities. Wherever possible, however, the DWG has attempted to indicate a non-SSM association in order to eliminate such locations or areas from further SSM consideration.

Of a total suggested list of 118 individual areas or locations, the Deployment Working Group has examined 95 locations in detail. A list

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of these locations or areas, together with the DWG evaluation for each, is contained in the summary section of this report (see Table 4). The DWG also examined the evidence on an additional 23 locations and found insufficient data to warrant listing these locations as suspect launch sites at this time. These locations are listed in Table 5.

Each member of the working group presented for group consideration all information known to his parent organization pertaining to suspect launch locations or areas. A systematic review of all evidence was carried out by the DWG, and summaries of all pertinent data for each location or area are included in the body of this report. While emphasizing the review of suspect ICBM launch locations, the DWG also examined and evaluated data for other surface-to-surface missile systems when such supporting evidence was found. In all cases, the DWG attempted to establish a relationship with the Soviet missile program for each site. It then attempted to isolate evidence pertaining to surface-to-surface missile deployment, and to determine the missile system suggested by the evidence. The DWG also considered the basic parameters necessary for a surface-to-surface missile site, such as geographic factors, technical characteristics, logistic factors, security, vulnerability, and available transportation. A majority evaluation of each area or location was assigned after a careful review of all evidence.

The following site evaluation criteria were approved by GMAIC and used by the Deployment Working Group:

#### CONFIRMED

Evidence verifies the installation as an SSM site or area, either operational or under construction.

#### PROBABLE

A probable SSM site or area is one whose existence has been confidently deduced on the basis of extensive reliable evidence which is highly indicative of an SSM site or area, either operational or under construction.

#### POSSIBLE

A possible SSM site or area is one whose existence has

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been <u>deduced</u> on the basis of <u>evidence</u> which is suggestive of an SSM site or area, either operational or under construction.

#### Undetermined

Available evidence does not provide sufficient information to permit a judgment as to a positive missile association or elimination of this location from consideration.

#### Doubtful

The available evidence and other evaluation factors suggest other activity at this location.

#### Negative

A rejected or negative site or area is one on which available evidence provides firm indication that it is not an SSM site or area.

N. B. "SSM" is used throughout as an example: to be replaced with the range/type of missile under consideration.

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#### SUMMARY

The DWG has, as previously mentioned, examined in detail a total of 95 individual areas or locations, which are annotated on the map of the USSR (see Map-1). The DWG also examined the evidence on an additional 23 locations and found insufficient data to warrant listing these locations as suspect launch sites at this time. Evaluations of evidence on the 95 locations have been made for both the ICBM and the MRBM according to the established criteria.

A summary of the evaluations for the areas and locations examined in detail are presented in Table 1.

Five locations are evaluated in the "possible" or higher category for the ICBM, while 19 locations are evaluated in the "possible" or higher category for the MRBM.

The three locations listed in the "confirmed" category of Table 1 are primarily research and development facilities, and have therefore, a limited operational capability.

TABLE 1. Summary of Site Evaluations.

| EVALUATION   | <u>ICBM</u> | MRBM |
|--------------|-------------|------|
| Confirmed    | 1           | 2    |
| Probable     | 0           | 14   |
| Possible     | 4           | 3    |
| Doubtful     | 11          | 16   |
| Negative     | 67          | 42   |
| Undetermined | 12          | 18   |
| TOTAL        | 95          | 95   |






Table 2 represents a listing by place name of all ICBM sites or locations considered in the evaluation categories of "confirmed," "probable," "possible," and "undetermined." All ICBM sites or locations evaluated as "doubtful" or "negative" are included in a summary list of locations in Table 5.

TABLE 2. Summary Evaluation of ICBM Sites and Locations.

| CONFIRMED | PROB-<br>ABLE | POSSIBLE   | UNDETERMINED   |
|-----------|---------------|--|--|
| Tyura Tam | None          | Kapustin Yar<br>Plesetsk<br>Polyarnyy Ural<br>Ust'-Ukhta | Berezovka Dolon' Luginy Shepetovka Surovatika  Alsunga Dundaga Durbe Kurmeni Piltene Slitere Volkovysk |

In the "undetermined" category shown in Table 2, the DWG has listed 12 locations; however, the evidence on Alsunga, Dundaga, Durbe, Kurmeni, Piltene, Slitere and Volkovysk is considered to be extremely fragmentary and unreliable. The DWG has, therefore, eliminated these locations from further consideration at this time.

The rangehead at Tyura Tam, with four launch pads, is the only confirmed ICBM site. At the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range, either launch area 2C or E is considered a possible ICBM launch site. The remaining three possible ICBM launch areas - Plesetsk, Polyarnyy Ural and Ust'-Ukhta - are located in the Arctic regions of the northwestern USSR. These possible launch areas could cover all targets in the US with missiles of about 5,300 nm range.

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
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Table 3 represents a listing by place name of all MRBM sites or locations considered in the evaluation categories of "confirmed," "probable," "possible," and "undetermined." All MRBM sites which were evaluated as "doubtful" or "negative" launch sites are included in the Summary List of Locations (Table 4).

TABLE 3. Summary Evaluation of MRBM Sites and Locations.

| CONFIRMED               | PROBABLE  | POSSIBLE                           | UNDETERMINED   |
|-------------------------|---|------------------------------------|--|
| Chelkar<br>Kapustin Yar | Mukachevo Podpoloz'ye Svalyava Uzhgorod Volovets Spassk-Dal'niy Barano- Orenburgskoye Grodekovo Novolitovsk Prokhory Suchan Yekaterinovka | Balaklava<br>Karangit<br>Khaapsalu | Belaya Tserkov' Gorodok Kandalaksha Khyrov Luginy Medved' Shepetovka Stalinabad Uman' Vinnitsa Vinniki |
|                         | Taurage<br>Paplaka  |                                    | Alsunga<br>Dundaga<br>Durbe<br>Kurmeni<br>Piltene<br>Slitere<br>Volkovysk                              |

In the "undetermined" category in Table 3, the DWG has listed 18 locations; however, the evidence on Alsunga, Dundaga, Durbe, Kurmeni, Piltene, Slitere, and Volkovysk is considered extremely fragmentary and unreliable. The DWG has, therefore, eliminated these locations from further consideration.



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The two confirmed MRBM sites, Chelkar and Kapustin Yar, listed in Table 3, are primarily research and development and training facilities, and have a limited operational capability. The evidence on 14 MRBM sites in the "probable" category were considered and summarized individually. Some of these site locations are contained within certain geographic areas (i.e., Carpathian and Far East Maritime). In these cases, evaluations have been made by area rather than by specific locations. This was done because much of the evidence pertaining to individual locations applied equally to other locations within the same area.

The probable and possible MRBM launch sites located in the Baltic, Carpathian, Crimea and Maritime Far East areas could cover all major targets in western Europe, the Near East, Japan and Okinawa, with the exception of Spain and Morocco.

TABLE 4. List of Sites Considered in Detail.

| LOCATION<br>NUMBER | PLACE<br>NAME             | EVALUA<br>ICBM | TION<br>MRBM                          |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| 110111111111       |                           |                | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| A-1                | Alsunga                   | Undetermined   | Undetermined                          |
| A-2                | Aral'sk                   | Negative       | Negative                              |
| A-3                | Ay Petri                  | Negative       | Negative                              |
| B-1                | Balaklava                 | Negative       | Possible                              |
| B-2                | Belaya Tserkov'           | Negative       | Undetermined                          |
| B-3                | Barano-Orenburg-<br>skoye | Negative       | Probable                              |
| B-4                | Berezovka                 | Undetermined   | Negative                              |
| C-1                | Chelkar                   | Negative       | Confirmed                             |
| D-1                | Daugavpils                | Negative       | Negative                              |

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| LOCATION | PLACE                     | EVALUATION   |              |
|----------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| NUMBER   | NAME                      | ICBM         | MRBM         |
| D-2      | Delyatin                  | Negative     | Negative     |
| D-3      | Dundaga                   | Undetermined | Undetermined |
| D-4      | Durbe                     | Undetermined | Undetermined |
| D-5      | Dolon'                    | Undetermined | Negative     |
| E-1      | Engel's                   | Negative     | Negative     |
| F-1      | Feodosiya                 | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| G-1      | Grobina                   | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| G-2      | Gorodok                   | Negative     | Undetermined |
| G-3      | Grodekovo                 | Negative     | Probable     |
| H-1      | Hiiumaa Island            | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| I-1      | Iul'tin                   | Negative     | Negative     |
| K-1      | Kaliningrad/<br>Leningrad | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| K-2      | Kamyshin                  | Negative     | Negative     |
| K-3      | Kandalaksha               | Negative     | Undetermined |
| K-4      | Kapustin Yar              | Possible     | Confirmed    |
| K-5      | Karangit                  | Negative     | Possible     |
| K-6      | Khabarovsk                | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| K-7      | Khaapsalu                 | Negative     | Possible     |
| K-8      | Khashuri                  | Negative     | Negative     |
| K-9      | Klaipeda                  | Negative     | Doubtful     |

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| LOCATION | PLACE            | EVALUATION   |              |
|----------|------------------|--------------|--------------|
| NUMBER   | NAME             | ICBM         | MRBM         |
| K-10     | Klesov           | Doubtful     | Doubtful     |
| K-11     | Kolgompya        | Negative     | Negative     |
| K-12     | Kraskino         | Negative     | Negative     |
| K-13     | Krasnoarmeyskoye |              |              |
| K-14     | Krasnoyarsk      | Negative     | Negative     |
| K-15     | Not Assigned     |              |              |
| K-16     | Kurmeni          | Undetermined | Undetermined |
| K-17     | Kyshtym          | Doubtful     | Negative     |
| K-18     | Khyrov           | Negative     | Undetermined |
| L-1      | Luginy           | Undetermined | Undetermined |
| L-2      | L'vov            | Negative     | Negative     |
| M-1      | Malaya Sazanka   | Negative     | Negative     |
| M - 2    | Medved'          | Negative     | Undetermined |
| M-3      | Mozhaysk         | Negative     | Negative     |
| M-4      | Mukachevo        | Doubtful     | Probable     |
| M-5      | Murmansk         | Doubtful     | Doubtful     |
| N-1      | Nizhnyaya Salda  | Negative     | Negative     |
| N-2      | Nizhnyaya Tura   | Negative     | Negative     |
| N-3      | Not Assigned     |              |              |
| N-4      | Novolitovsk      | Negative     | Probable     |

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| LOCATION    | PLACE             | EVALUATION   |              |
|-------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| NUMBER      | NAME              | ICBM         | MRBM         |
| O-1         | Olen'ya           | Negative     | Negative     |
| P-l         | Paplaka           | Negative     | Probable     |
| P-2         | Piltene           | Undetermined | Undetermined |
| P-3         | Plesetsk          | Possible     | Negative     |
| P-4         | Poltava           | Negative     | Negative     |
| P-5         | Polyarnyy Ural    | Possible     | Negative     |
| P-6         | Podpoloz'ye       | Doubtful     | Probable     |
| P-7         | Prokhory          | Negative     | Probable     |
| S-1         | Saaremaa Island   | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| <b>S-</b> 2 | Samland Peninsula | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| S-3         | Sarny             | Doubtful     | Doubtful     |
| S-4         | Sarova            | Negative     | Negative     |
| S-5         | Sary Shagan       | Negative     | Negative     |
| S-6         | Semipalatinsk     | Negative     | Negative     |
| S-7         | Sevastopol'       | Negative     | Negative     |
| S-8         | Shepetovka        | Undetermined | Undetermined |
| S-9         | Shikhany          | Negative     | Negative     |
| S-10        | Suchan            | Negative     | Probable     |
| S-11        | Slavyanka         | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| S-12        | Slitere           | Undetermined | Undetermined |

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| LOCATION     | PLACE          | EVALUA       | TION         |
|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| NUMBER       | NAME           | ICBM         | MRBM         |
| S-13         | Sovetsk        | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| S-14         | Spassk-Dal'niy | Negative     | Probable     |
| S-15         | Stalinabad     | Negative     | Undetermined |
| <b>S</b> -16 | Sudak          | Negative     | Negative     |
| S-17         | Surovatikha    | Undetermined | Negative     |
| S-18         | Svalyava       | Doubtful     | Probable     |
| <b>T-</b> 1  | Tallinn        | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| T-2          | Tashara        | Negative     | Negative     |
| T-3          | Taurage        | Doubtful     | Probable     |
| T-4          | Tiksi          | Negative     | Negative     |
| T-5          | Tomsk          | Negative     | Negative     |
| T-6          | Tuapse         | Negative     | Negative     |
| T-7          | Tukums         | Doubtful     | Doubtful     |
| T-8          | Tyura Tam      | Confirmed    | Negative     |
| U - 1        | Ugol'nyye Kopi | Negative     | Doubtful     |
| U-2          | Ukraina        | Negative     | Negative     |
| U-3          | Uman'          | Negative     | Undetermined |
| U-4          | Ust'-Ukhta     | Possible     | Negative     |
| U-5          | Uzhgorod       | Doubtful     | Probable     |
| V-1          | Valday         | Negative     | Negative     |



| LOCATION | PLACE            | EVALUA       | TION         |
|----------|------------------|--------------|--------------|
| NUMBER_  | NAME_            | ICBM         | MRBM         |
| V-2      | Verkhnyaya Salda | Negative     | Negative     |
| V-3      | Vinnitsa         | Negative     | Undetermined |
| V - 4    | Vladivostok      | Negative     | Negative     |
| V-5      | Volkovysk        | Undetermined | Undetermined |
| V-6      | Volovets         | Doubtful     | Probable     |
| V-7      | Vinniki          | Negative     | Undetermined |
| Y-1      | Yuryuzan         | Negative     | Negative     |
| Y-2      | Yekaterinovka    | Negative     | Probable     |
| Z-1      | Znamensk         | Negative     | Negative     |

The DWG also examined the evidence on an additional 23 locations, and found insufficient data to warrant listing these locations as suspect launch sites at this time.

TABLE 5. List of Sites Eliminated from Detailed Examination.

| Alykel'         | Krasnoye    | Sortavala        |
|-----------------|-------------|------------------|
| Bukhta Ugol'nyy | Motygino    | Toropets         |
| (Beringovsky)   | Nesterov    | Ukulan           |
| Cherepanovo     | Obninsk     | Ureliki          |
| Golitsyno       | Okhotsk     | Yoshkar Ola      |
| Istra           | Puchezh     | Voskresenka      |
| Ivanovo         | Sambor      | Ye <b>v</b> lakh |
| Kiev            | Simferopol' | Zavitaya         |

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LOCATION: Alsunga


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|   | SH-0288/60<br>A-1  | 25X           |
| I. Conclusions  |                    |               |
| Alsunga is an undetermined* ICBM site.  It is an undetermined* MRBM site. |                    |               |
| II. Background  |                    |               |
| TALENT photography of 1956, which is partiall shows no unusual activity.  | y cloud-covered,   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |                    |               |
|   |                    |               |
|   |                    | 25 <b>X</b> ′ |
|   |                    |               |
|   |                    |               |

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<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "undetermined," and one member voted "doubtful."

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LOCATION: Aral'sk


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SH-0288/60 A-2

## I. Conclusions

The Aral'sk area is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a negative MRBM area.

#### II. Background

Aral'sk has long been associated with the Soviet guided missile program in the capacity of a support base for the KYMTR 650-nm impact area. A facility at Aral'sk is known as "Base 3" of the KYMTR. Aircraft from Kapustin Yar frequently visit Aral'sk in normal support roles, and there are communication facilities of the KYMTR located there.

Aircraft from Tyura Tam also have frequently visited this location, but the flights were probably associated with a TTMTR station (C05 group) which is located nearby. Aircraft flying in range support roles have utilized Aral'sk as a via point while enroute from the VAWARC and KYMTR rangeheads to downrange facilities. Aircraft flying from Moscow to Tyura Tam as well as aircraft flying from Moscow to the Sary Shagan area have also often utilized Aral'sk as a normal via point.



It is known that personnel who launched some 350-nm missiles from a point approximately 50 nm northeast of Aral'sk (SP-2) probably staged from Aral'sk. The firings were for training purposes, and the exact location of fixed facilities, if any, is unknown.

A special construction unit was noted at Aral'sk in 1954. The unit is believed to have been involved in the construction of instrumentation and support facilities for the KYMTR 650-nm impact area.

25X1

TALENT photography of August 1957 and July 1959 revealed no unusual activity in the Aral'sk area which could be interpreted as a missile launch site.

- 2 -



SH-0288/60 No Pages 4

LOCATION: Ay Petri

: 250

WAC

NO : A-3

COORD : 44 28N - 34 05E (Approximate)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

33° 30' SIMFEROPOL PESCHANOYE KACHA BAKHCHISARAY BLACK SEA **₹** PEREDOVOYE 5 10 NAUTICAL MILES CIA/PIC G-SADS

SH-0288/60

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1

A-3

## I. Conclusions

Ay Petri is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.

## II. Background

| The collateral sources (see below) describing in detail missile      |
|--|
| sites in the Ay Petri area have been discredited by subsequent field |
| evaluation. Information from these sources has been determined to be |
| inaccurate and largely fabrication.                                  |
| and TALENT photographic  |
| coverage of 1956, 1957, and 1960 presents no evidence of missile     |
| installations.   |
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Ay Petri is near Simeiz, which is the location of an astrophysical observatory, and a large radio telescope is known to be located in the area. To a large extent, observation of installations

- 2 -

| <br>) | Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 TOP SECRET SH-0288/60 A-3 | 25X1<br>25X1 |
|-------|---|--------------|
|       | in the Ay Petri area is indicative of electronics activity, which may or may not be missile-related.      |              |
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- 3 -

TOP SECRET

25X1


SH-0288/60 No Pages 6

LOCATION: Balaklava

NO : B-1 : 44 30N - 33 32E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60

: 250 WA.C

COORD




Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7


SH-0288/60

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B-1





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SH-0288/60 B-1

## I. Conclusions

Balaklava is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a possible MRBM site.

#### II. Background

Balaklava became missile-suspect when 1956 TALENT coverage disclosed a heavily-secured unidentified facility having a configuration which suggested a missile launch site. The facility had what were believed to be two elliptical launch pads. Configuration of the two pads makes the determination of the type of missiles launched here very difficult. The location of the facility on the Black Sea coast adjacent to the important naval center of Sevastopol', and the orientation of the pads toward the Black Sea, suggest a possible research and development program for cruise-type missiles for naval use. The suggested function of this installation was subsequently confirmed by a Soviet defector who, while stationed in the general area as an artillery man, had witnessed launchings of what were apparently cruise-type missiles from the facility. The launchings occurred from the summer of 1955 to November 1956. The defector also reported that naval personnel were associated with the installation.

TALENT coverage of February 1960 shows a build-up in the surrounding area, including the addition of drive-through/checkout buildings, storage and administrative buildings, and military housing. No changes in the launch site are apparent.

Previous information provided from various sources is consistent with the use of this facility for testing cruise-type missiles. However, the build-up of the installation revealed in the February 1960 photography is suggestive of facilities usually associated with ballistic missiles. The drive-through buildings are smaller than those seen at TTMTR and KYMTR for ICBMs and MRBMs.

It appears likely that cruise missiles were launched from this area prior to 1960. However, at present the evidence points toward the construction of a possible ballistic missile complex for the support of missiles no larger than the MRBM category.

- 3 -

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7  $\underline{TOP~SECRET}$ SH-0288/60 B-1 1960 FIGURE 2. EAST PORTION OF THE BALAKLAVA INSTALLATION (B-1). Dates of photography,



25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1 25X1



SH-0288/60 No Pages 4


LOCATION: Belaya Tserkov'

: 49 47N - 30 07E (City)

: 233 WAC

NO : B-2

DATE: 1 Sep 60



- 1 -

TOP SECRET

| TOP SECRET                                       |                             |
|--|-----------------------------|
|  | SH-0288/60<br>B-2           |
| Conclusions                                      |                             |
| Belaya Tserkov' is a negative ICBM               | area                        |
| It is an undetermined MRBM area.                 | arcu.                       |
| Background                                       |                             |
| Evidence indicates some missile-rel erkov' area. | ated activity in the Belaya |
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|  | and the Releve Taerbord     |
| There is no recent photographic coveras.         | er of the Belaya Iselkov    |
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
SH-0288/60 No Pages 2

LOCATION: Barano-Orenburgskoye

: 44 22N - 131 27E (City) COORD

WAC : 282 NO : B-3

DATE: 1 Sep 60



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| 1                                   |                          | SH-0288/60           |               |

B-3

(Barano-Orenburgskoye has been associated with a missile division headquarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analysis of the Spassk-Dal'niy area /location S-14/ for specific information related to this site.)


## TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 No Pages 10

LOCATION: Berezovka NO : B-4

COORD : 51 11N - 46 00E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 235



SH-0288/60 B-4

#### I. Conclusions

The Berezovka installation is an <u>undetermined\* ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.

#### II. Background

TALENT photography of revealed a major installation under construction near the village of Berezovka at 51 11N - 46 00E. It is situated along an improved and partially new highway under construction between Engel's, 17.5 nm to the north, and Stalingrad, 170 nm to the south. The installation encompasses an area 4 nm long which lies within and on either side of the Ovrag (Ravine) Berezovyy. This ravine, formed by an intermittent stream which empties into the nearby Volga River, ranges in width from 1,900 to 5,000 feet and has escarpments on each side 50 to 60 feet high (see Figure 1). The complex consists of a partially double-fenced operations area, containing four sites of extensive excavating, and three support areas.

The three support areas provide housing, administrative, maintenance, construction and utility facilities for the complex. Accommodations for construction personnel include dormitory space for an estimated 428 persons and housing for 14 families. Quarters under construction for permanent personnel include barracks space for approximately 440 persons and housing for an estimated 270 families.

Power for the complex is provided by an overhead power line from Engel's. Photographic evidence indicated that the complex will not require large amounts of water for its operations. A small building with an adjacent mast could provide radio communications with Engel's.

The nearby villages of Berezovka and Krasnoarmeyskoye have no facilities for providing operational support or other services to the complex. External logistical support will probably be provided by the Saratov-Engel's urban area, which has the nearest air and rail facilities. Since there is no evidence that a railroad line will be constructed from Engel's to service the complex, logistical support will probably move along the improved road under construction between Engel's and Stalingrad.

25X1

<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "undetermined" on ICBM, one member voted "probable" on ICBM.

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25X1 SH-0288/60 B-4




FIGURE 1. INSTALLATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION NEAR BEREZOVKA (B-4).

- 3 -

SH-0288/60 B-4




FIGURE 2. OPERATIONS AREA AT THE BEREZOVKA INSTALLATION (B-4). Date of photography,

25X1

SH-0288/60 B-4



FIGURE 3. SUPPORT AREA "A" AT THE BEREZOVKA INSTALLATION (B-4). Date of photography,

25X1

25X1

- 6 -

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25X1

SH-0288/60 B-4

The main road from Engel's intersects the internal service road network at wide-angle turns. At the time of photography, neither the main road nor the service roads appeared to be surfaced. However, the road-bed of the main road from Engel's has been completed, measuring 30 feet wide, and there are no steep grades at any point along this road.

|        | A detailed analysis of this installation is contain | ed in the source |
|--------|---|------------------|
| refere | ices. However, the function of this installation is | still undeter-   |
| mined. |   |                  |
|        |   | 25X              |
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25X1

SH-0288/60 B-4



FIGURE 4. SUPPORT AREA "B" AT THE BEREZOVKA INSTALLATION (B-4). Date of photography,

- 8 -

25X1

SH-0288/60 B-4




FIGURE 5. SUPPORT AREA "C" AT THE BEREZOVKA INSTALLATION (B-4). Date of photography,

- 9 -

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

LOCATION: Chelkar

: 48 16N - 59 45E (Installation)


DATE: 1 Sep 60

: C-1

NO

WAC : 246

COORD



**TOP SECRET** 

25X1

SH-0288/60 C-1




FIGURE 1. FIELD-TYPE LAUNCH SITE AT CHELKAR (C-1).

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25X1

SH-0288/60 C-1

#### I. Conclusions

The Chelkar area is a negative ICBM area.

It is a confirmed MRBM training area.

The Chelkar area is located deep within USSR territory, and is far enough from potential MRBM targets to render it almost useless as a deployment site.

| deployment site.   |                  |
|--|------------------|
| II. Background   |                  |
| TALENT photography of has provided evidence that the site at Chelkar is a field-type launch site, consisting primarily of revetments for vehicles, and has been used for firings of mediumrange missiles. The site is the location of a KYMTR launch point (SP-5), | 25X <sup>-</sup> |
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- 3 -

SH-0288/60 C-1




FIGURE 2. COMPARISON OF SP-5 SITE AT CHELKAR WITH LAUNCH AREAS 1-C AND 3-C AT KYMTR.

SH-0288/60 No Pages <u>4</u>

LOCATION: Daugavpils


NO : D-1

COORD


: 55 53N - 26 31E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 168



SH-0288/60 D-1







FIGURE 1. SECURED INSTALLATION NEAR DAUGAVPILS.



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|------|--|-------------------|
| I.   | Conclusions  Daugavpils is a negative ICBM site.  It is a negative MRBM site.  |                   |
| п.   | Background   |                   |
| ins  | TALENT photograp<br>verage in July 1956 of the area revealed a secured, rail-se<br>tallation containing a number of mounded tanks, numerous<br>eventional rail cars, and other miscellaneous facilities. T | erved             |

- 3 -

D-1



FIGURE 2. SECURED INSTALLATION NEAR DAUGAVPILS. Date of photography

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25X1

25X1 25X1

LOCATION: Delyatin

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
COORD

WAC

: 48 32N - 24 38E (City)

NO : D-2

DATE: 1 Sep 60



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 TOP SECRET  25X1 SH-0288/60 D-2  I. Conclusions  Delyatin is a negative ICBM site.  It is a negative MRBM site.  25X1 25X1 |
|--|
| Delyatin is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> site.   |
| It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> site.   |
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- 2 -

LOCATION: Dundaga


NO : D-3

COORD

: 57 31N - 22 21E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 153



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| SH-0288/60  |      |
| D-3   |      |

### I. Conclusions

Dundaga is an undetermined\* ICBM site. It is an undetermined\* MRBM site.

## II. Background

A search of TALENT photography, dated July 1956, covering a 40 nm radius centered on Dundaga revealed no indicators of unusual construction or missile activity. This photographic evidence would negate most of the collateral reports with dates of information in 1956 and early 1957.



TOP SECRET

25X1

LOCATION: Durbe


NO D-4

COORD

56 35N - 21 21E (City)

1 Sep 60 DATE:

WAC : 152



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|---------------------|--|---|--------------|
|                     |  | SH-0288/60<br>D-4                                       |              |
| I. Conclusions      |  |   |              |
| Durbe is a          | an <u>undetermined</u> * <u>ICBM</u> s               | site.   |              |
| It is an <u>ur</u>  | ndetermined* MRBM site                               | •   |              |
| II. Background      |  |   |              |
|                     | photography of 1956 show<br>rage is not complete due | s no unusual activity in the to scattered clouds. There |              |
|                     | -  |   | 25X1         |
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
- 2 -


<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "undetermined," one member voted "doubtful."

LOCATION: Dolon' NO : D-5

COORD : 50 34N - 79 14E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 239





# TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 No Pages 2

E-1

DATE: 1 Sep 60

NO

LOCATION: Engel's

COORD : 51 29N - 46 13E (Airfield)

WAC : 235

46° 30' STARITSA SHUMELKA SARATOV 51° 301 KRASNYY TEKSTIL'SHCHIK BEZYMYANNAYA UZMOR'YE KRASNOARMEYSKOYE BEREZOVKA VOROSHILOVGRAD STEPNOYE PRIVOLZHSKOYE SADOVOYE KIROVO . KRASNOARMEÝSK **∕** VOSKRESENKA VAULINO UST'ZOLIKHA 10 STAROYE PRIVAL NOYE CIA/PIC G-3454 NAUTICAL MILES

SH-0288/60 E-1



#### I. Conclusions

Engel's is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.

### II. Background

Engel's Airfield is located 4 nm east of the town of Engel's and 10 nm southeast of Saratov. This Long Range Airfield, like Poltava, has an associated Modified Type II Special Weapons Storage Area 2.5 nm southeast of the airfield with one completed bunker and a second bunker under construction. December 1959 TALENT photography of the airfield does not show anything on the airfield which can be interpreted as a missile launching site. This airfield will probably provide support for the unidentified Krasnoarmeyskoye installation (Location K-13), 22.5 nm to the south.

25X1

1 Sep 60

F-1

NO

DATE:

LOCATION: Feodosiya

: 45 06 36N - 35 27 06E

WAC : 249

35° 30' 🔆 36° 00' KAZANTIP CHEGEN KAZANTIPSKIY BAY SIVASH SEA ARABATSKIY BAY NOVO NIKOLAYEVKA SEM'KOLODEZEY AK-MONAY KIYET SEIT ASAN KOY-ASAN ARMA-ELI MARFOVKA DALNIYE KAMYSHI BALIZHNYAYA BAYBUGA ARYLAR KONCHEK FEODOSIYSKIY BAY KARANGIT **FEODOSIYA** 45° 001-KOKTOBEL OTUZY BLACK SEA 10 NAUTICAL MILES CIA/PIC G-3448

TOP SECRET



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#### I. Conclusions

Feodosiya is a negative ICBM site.

It is a doubtful MRBM site.

It is a possible site for the launching of short range cruise-type missiles.

#### II. Background

25X1 TALENT photography of revealed an unidentified installation located at 45 06 36N - 35 27 06E, near Dalniye Kamyshi. This installation consists of: an administrative and personnel area (see photo, annotation B); a storage and shop area (B); an unidentified circular platform or tank (D); a motor pool (C); four concrete pads (A); and, a rail siding which appears to be under construction (E). The four concrete pads, each approximately 30 feet in diameter, are revetted on two sides and have what appear to be dark objects in the center of each pad. No electronics installations appear to be affiliated with this installation. 25X1

TOP SECRET

: G-1

1 Sep 60


NO

DATE:

LOCATION: Grobina

56 33N - 21 10E (City) COORD

WAC 152




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|---|-------------|
| SH-0288<br>G-1  | 25X1<br>/60 |
| I. Conclusions  | `           |
| Grobina is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>doubtful MRBM</u> site.       |             |
| II. Background  |             |
|   | 25X1        |
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|   |             |
| TALENT photography of 1956 shows no missile-related activity in the Grobina area. |             |
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LOCATION: Gorodok

: 49 47N - 23 39E (City) COORD

WAC : 232 NO : G-2

DATE: 1 Sep 60



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP7 | #<br>2 PT04757         |
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| TOP SECRET  |                        |
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|   |                        |

25X1

SH-0288/60 G-2

# I. Conclusions

Gorodok is a <u>negative</u>  $\underline{ICBM}$  area. It is an <u>undetermined</u>  $\underline{MRBM}$  area.

## II. Background


| occasion, include | flights with definite missile range-associations have, on ed Gorodok in their itineraries. Direct flight associated and the missile test ranges, however, have not |      |
|-------------------|--|------|
| been recorded.    | rouse and the imposite test ranges, however, have not  | 25X1 |
|                   |  | 25X1 |
| There is area.    | no recent usable photographic coverage of the Gorodok  |      |
|                   |  | 25X1 |
|                   |  |      |
|                   |  |      |
|                   |  |      |
|                   |  |      |
|                   |  |      |

LOCATION: Grodekovo

COORD : 44 25N - 131 24E (City)

WAC : 282 NO : G-3

DATE: 1 Sep 60



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|--|----------------------|---------------------|
| TOP SECRET   |                      | * ~~ ′25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|  | SH-0288/60           | 25 <b>X</b> 1       |
| i. ·   | G-3                  |                     |
|  |                      |                     |

(Grodekovo has been associated with a missile division headquarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analysis of the Spassk-Dal'niy area / Tocation S-14/ for specific information related to this site.)

- 2 -

LOCATION: Hiiumaa Island

NO H-1


COORD

: 58 50N - 22 40E (Island)

DATE: 1 Se**p** 60

WAC

: 153



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TOP\_SECRET

SH-0288/60 H-1 25X1 25X1

### I. Conclusions

Hiiumaa Island is a <u>negative</u> <u>ICBM</u> area. It is a doubtful MRBM area.

on the area.

## II. Background

Hiiumaa Island became a suspect SSM site location on the basis of numerous collateral reports of missile sites, unusual construction activity and unusual security in the area, and also because of its proximity to other possible or suspect missile locations. The bulk of these reports, however, pre-date 1955. There is no recent photographic coverage or

25X1


# TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 No Pages 4

LOCATION: Iul'tin NO : I-1

COORD : 67 50N - 178 48W (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 75



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- . 25X1

SH-0288/60

### I. Conclusions

Iul'tin is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a negative\* MRBM site.

### II. Background

There is no rail or road transportation to support missile 25X1

There is no rail or road transportation to support missile activity at this location, and port facilities at Egvekinot, which serves Iul'tin, are restricted to summer operations due to the Arctic location of the port.

Extensive research of air activity in the Eastern Arctic region showed no significant transport activity (military and non-scheduled civil) at Iul'tin, although there have been pronounced shuttle activities involving other areas of the Soviet polar region. Most of this activity was directed to the normal, seasonal re-supply of the Ice Island Expeditions at points No 8 and No 9.

The construction of a permanent airfield at Iul'tin was recommended in June 1959. In November 1959, construction of facilities for large aircraft was disrupted by the withdrawal of the main body of the Chukotka Construction Directorate, and by the delay in transferring adequate construction workers to the Iul'tin combine to complete the job.

Other than a few vague, low-level collateral reports of missile launching sites in the Chukotsk Peninsula, there is no collateral pertaining to site construction.

WINDFALL photography of March 1959 and April 1960 shows extensive mining activity in the Iul'tin area, but no missile or unusual activity was apparent.

<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "negative" MRBM, one member voted "doubtful" MRBM.






LOCATION: Kaliningrad-Leningrad Area ("Lollipops") NO : K-1

COORD : 54 43N - 20 30E/59 55N - 30 15E DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 169



25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 K-1



- 2 -

TOP SECRE

25X1 25X1



TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 K-1

### I. Conclusions

The "lollipop" sites in the Kaliningrad/Leningrad area are negative ICBM sites.

They are possible SSM sites for shorter range missiles of an undetermined type.

### II. Background

Numerous coastal defense-type emplacements in the Kaliningrad area have been referred to as "lollipop" sites, so designated because of the appearance of cleared circular areas surrounding the isolated railway spurs or roads. Emplacements such as these were generally of World War I and II vintage, and were used as gun emplacements.

Four "lollipop" type sites were considered: two west of Leningrad (59 45N - 28 07E and 59 43N - 28 01E), one at Liepaja (56 37N - 21 02E), and one west of Kaliningrad (54 42N - 19 56E). The two sites in the Leningrad area were covered only on German photography of 1944 and 1941, respectively, and were under construction when photographed. Although the areas of the Liepaja site and the site west of Kaliningrad were covered by German photography of 1941 and 1944, respectively, neither site was present at the time. The latter two sites do appear on 1956 photography and some current improvement or construction was under way. All four of these sites are similar in appearance.

It appears likely that these sites were originally designed as rail gun positions, although it is feasible that the Soviets may have converted them to shorter range missile launch facilities. However, the rail sites are very closely spaced, and there are no support facilities in the vicinity for missile assembly and checkout.

the vicinity for missile assembly and checkout.

- 3 -




LOCATION: Kamyshin


COORD : 50 06N - 45 24E (City)

WAC

NO : K-2

DATE: 1 Sep 60





25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 No Pages 4


LOCATION: Kandalaksha


COORD : 67 09N - 32 25E (City)

WAC

NO : K-3

DATE: 1 Sep 60





K-4

1 Sep 60

NO


DATE:


LOCATION: Kapustin Yar

: 48 36N - 46 18E (Area 2C)

48 46N - 46 18E (Area E)

WAC : 235





**TOP SECRE1** 

2

TOP SECRET 25X1

## I. Conclusions

KYMTR is a confirmed MRBM Research and Development and Troop Training facility.

Area 2C is a possible ICBM launch area. The facilities at areas 2C and E appear to be adequate for the launching of missiles with a range greater than 1,100 nm. The Series 65 missile was probably launched from one of these areas in July and August 1960. The facilities at area 2C appear quite similar to the facilities at launch area C at Tyura Tam.

## II. Background

The launch complexes associated with surface-to-surface missile systems at the Kapustin Yar range were examined in detail in order to ascertain whether any of these facilities could be used for the ICBM. The facilities at areas E and 2C are thought to have the physical characteristics necessary to support activity for ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 1,100 nm. No other facilities at the range are believed capable of long-range ballistic missile operations.

Complex E is a new launch facility near Complex A, and was under construction in December 1959. It consists of a large building, without rail connection, similar in size to a rail drive-through building at Tyura Tam. A single launch pad is also under construction in this area. The physical size of the facilities suggests that they were designed for a missile which could have a range greater than 1,100 nm. Another equally likely possibility for these new facilities is for testing of a solid propellant, shorter-range ballistic missile.

TALENT photography indicate that launch areas 1C and 3C have been used for the 1,100 nm and 700 nm ballistic missiles. The facilities associated with the new launch pad at 2C indicate a missile system with a range possibly longer than 1,100 nm, and logistical requirements greater than previously observed at the Kapustin Yar rangehead.

A summary of a detailed examination of the new facilities in Complex C is as follows:

1. Instrumentation and/or guidance facilities, which closely resemble equivalent facilities at the Tyura Tam area, are available at the KYMTR rangehead.

- 3 -

TOP SECRET




FIGURE 2. LAUNCH COMPLEX C AT KAPUSTIN YAR.




FIGURE 3. LAUNCH AREA 2C AT KAPUSTIN YAR.




FIGURE 4. LAUNCH AREA 2C AT KAPUSTIN YAR. Date of photography,

- 2. A long-range communications facility, with rhombic antennas oriented at was under construction in December 1959. The facility is located immediately behind launch area 2C. This is the first apparent long-range communications facility at the KYMTR. The antenna system's orientation is generally directed toward the Yeniseysk area, a FLIM FLAM station location known to support TTMTR firings. FLIM FLAM data was received from the station at Yeniseysk during a Series 65 firing from KYMTR in August 1960. Signals for this transmitter have not been identified.
- 3. It is estimated that the facilities in area 2C could not have been completed prior to May 1960.
- 4. A large support facility is under construction which contains a large rail drive-through building, 185 by 125 feet, that is similar to a building at Tyura Tam. Additional water and power lines are being installed.
- 5. A rail line is under construction, from the range support area, which probably will stop at the launch Complex C support facility. This is an apparent first requirement for close proximity of a rail off-loading facility adjacent to a launch pad at KYMTR.

25X1

6. The launch pads under construction at area 2C are the largest at KYMTR and will be able to handle equipment for a large-size missile system. The design incorporates road-served pads, with revetted servicing areas below the level of the pads which may be covered when construction is completed.

A Series 65 missile was fired from either launch area E or 2C at KYMTR. The facilities at both areas appear to be adequate for launching of missiles of a range greater than 1,100 nm. Area 2C, is a more likely launch area for ICBMs than is area E. Facilities at area 2C appear to be quite similar to the facilities noted at launch area C at TTMTR.




FIGURE 5. LAUNCH COMPLEX E AT KAPUSTIN YAR.




FIGURE 6. LAUNCH COMPLEX E AT KAPUSTIN YAR. Date of photography,

1 Sep 60

LOCATION: Karangit NO : K-5

COORD: 45 02N - 35 57E (Installation) DATE:

WAC : 249



TOP SECRET

# TOP SECRET

25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 K-5



25X1

KARANGIT INSTALLATION (K-5).

| TOP SECRET   |  |
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|  | SH-0288/60<br>K-5  |
| I. <u>Conclusions</u>  |  |
| Karangit is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>possible short or medium range surface-t</u> missile site of undetermined type. | o-surface  |
| II. Background   |  |
| associated concrete pad approximately 200 by 190 feet. I secured area is located on an adjacent hill and may be an facility.         |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  | Karangit is a negative ICBM site.  It is a possible short or medium range surface-to missile site of undetermined type.  II. Background  TALENT photography of July 1956 reveals that the installation consists of two secured areas. The larger are four primary buildings, several smaller structures, and associated concrete pad approximately 200 by 190 feet. To secured area is located on an adjacent hill and may be an |

1 Sep 60

K-6

NO

DATE:


:

LOCATION: Khabarovsk

: 48 30N - 135 06E (City)

WAC : 204

COORD



# TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 K-6

### Conclusions I.

The Khabarovsk area is a negative\* ICBM area. It is a doubtful\*\* MRBM area.

### II. Background

Khabarovsk became missile-suspect on the basis of collateral reports, and TALENT coverage (March 1958) which disclosed a large unidentified facility under construction (48 28N-134 49E). The function of this facility could not be determined from photo interpretation. However, the following possible functions, in the order of their probability, were suggested: (1) An electronics site; (2) a SAM site; (3) an MRBM or ICBM site; (4) or, a combination electronics and SAM site. In addition to the unidentified facility, TALENT depicted several electronics installations in the area, including three KRUG sites.

25X1

tive" on MRBM.

<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "negative" on ICBM, one member voted "doubtful" on ICBM. \*\*Three members voted "doubtful" on MRBM, two members voted "nega-

<sup>- 2 -</sup>



LOCATION: Khaapsalu (also Haapsalu)


NO : K-7

COORD

: 58 56N - 23 33E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 153





| TALENT photography of is available; how there is no large-scale coverage and the poor quality of track erage precludes photo-identification. |
|--|
| there is no large-scale coverage and the poor quality of track   |
| there is no large-scale coverage and the poor quality of track   |
| there is no large-scale coverage and the poor quality of track   |
| there is no large-scale coverage and the poor quality of track   |
| erage precludes photo-identification.  |
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SH-0288/60 No Pages 2

LOCATION: Khashuri


: 41 59N - 43 36E (City)

WAC : 325

COORD

NO : K-8

**D**ATE: 1 Sep 60






25X1 25X1

LOCATION: Klaipeda

:  $55 \, 43N - 21 \, 08E \, (City)$ COORD

NO : K-9 DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 168



TOP SECRET

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|--|-----------------------------|---------------|
|  | SH-0288/60<br>K-9           | 25X1          |
| I. Conclusions   |                             |               |
| Klaipeda is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>doubtful MRBM</u> site.  It is a <u>possible SAM site</u> . |                             |               |
| II. Background   |                             |               |
|  |                             | 25X1          |
| photography of 1956 was heavily cloud-covered in the unusual activity was apparent on the photography.           | TALENT<br>Klaipeda area. No | 25X1          |
| undoddi delivit, was epperent in the proof of vir  |                             | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
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-0288/60 25X1

SH-0288/60 No Pages 2


LOCATION: Klesov

NO : K-10

COORD

: 51 20N - 26 56E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60



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| K-10   |   |      |

(Information on Klesov is discussed and evaluated with Sarny, Location S-3).



: K-11

DATE: 1 Sep 60


NO

LOCATION: Kolgompya

: 59 49N - 28 32E (Rail Spurs)

WAC : 153

COORD





SH-0288/60 K-11



INACTIVE RAIL SPURS NEAR KOLGOMPYA (K-11). Date of photography,

25X1

- 2 -

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25X1

SH-0288/60 K-11

# I. Conclusions

The Kolgompya rail spurs are  $\underline{\text{negative}}$   $\underline{\text{ICBM}}$  sites. They are negative MRBM sites.


## II. Background

| The two rail spurs situated about a mile apart in the area south       |
|--|
| of Kolgompya are covered by 1944 and 1956 photography. TALENT pho-     |
| tography of 1956 indicates that sections of the rail line serving both |
| spurs are overgrown with vegetation. Therefore, the spurs are consi-   |
| dered inactive.  |

| 25X1 |
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LOCATION: Kraskino NO : K-12 COORD : 42 44N - 130 48E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 290



**TOP SECRET** 

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|--|---------------------------|
|  | SH-0288/60<br>K-12        |
| I. Conclusions   |                           |
| Kraskino is a <u>negative</u> <u>ICBM</u> area.  It is a <u>negative</u> <u>MRBM</u> area.  It is a <u>probable</u> <u>SAM</u> site location.  |                           |
| II. Background   |                           |
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| Photography of December 1956 revealed no missile sites; however, the poor quality, small sca and snow cover on the photography precluded any december 1956 revealed no missile sites; however, the poor quality, small sca | ale, image distortion     |
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LOCATION: Krasnoarmeyskoye


NO K-13

COORD

: 51 11N - 46 00E (Installation)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 235




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SH-0288/60 K-13

(An installation at 51 11N - 46 00E is sometimes referred to as Krasnoarmeyskoye, but is usually referred to as Berezovka. Information on this installation is discussed with Berezovka, Location B-4.)

LOCATION: Krasnoyarsk (Dodonovo) NO: K-14 COORD: 56 17N - 93 27E (Dodonovo) DATE: 1 Sep 60



| Sanitized Copy / | Approved for Release | 2011/05/10: CIA- | -RDP78T04757 <i>A</i> | 000100010001-7 |
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|                  |                      |                  | 1                     |                |

TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 K-14 **- 4**25X1 25X1

### I. Conclusions

The Krasnoyarsk (Dodonovo) facility is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a negative MRBM area.

### II. Background

The information on this site is principally dated prior to 1956. Construction of this facility began in 1949, and expansion has continued to the present time. The construction has been done by a unit of the Chief Directorate of Industrial Construction, the agency that constructed other known nuclear energy installations, as well as other less significant facilities. An FPN was noted in 1957, which might represent a GUASS-MO unit.

Some mining or tunneling, as well as several manufacturing-

Some mining or tunneling, as well as several manufacturingtype buildings, can be seen on 1956 GENETRIX photography of the area. A rail line was discovered leading to the facility in 1956, but no security fence was apparent. However, it is known that security passes are required for entrance to the facility.

25X1



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SH-0288/60 No Pages 2

NO : K-15 DATE: 1 Sep 60

(Location K-15 not assigned)

: K-16

LOCATION: Kurmeni


: 56 40N - 25 42E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

NO

WAC : 153

COORD



25X1

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T047  | 757A000100010001-7           | 25X1          |
|---|------------------------------|---------------|
|   | SH-0288/60<br>K-16           | 25X1          |
| I. Conclusions  |                              |               |
| Kurmeni is an <u>undetermined* ICBM</u> site.  It is an <u>undetermined* MRBM</u> site.   |                              |               |
| II. Background  |                              |               |
| Evidence possibly pertaining to missile activity in includes a report of a restricted area and an unevaluated C report of missile units in the general area. These and other reports are not considered a sufficient basis for evaluating | onfidential<br>er collateral |               |
| On TALENT photography of 1956, the area surrou village of Kurmeni was partially obscured by scattered clouunusual activity was apparent on the photography.   | 9                            |               |
|   |                              | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
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<sup>\*</sup> Four members voted "undetermined," one member voted "doubtful".


LOCATION: Kyshtym

NO : K-17

COORD

: 55 42N - 60 34E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A00010                                     | 00010001-7 . 25%<br>25% |
|--|-------------------------|
| SH   | -0288/60                |
| K-:  | ·                       |
| I. <u>Conclusions</u> Kyshtym is a <u>doubtful</u> * <u>ICBM</u> area.  It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area. |                         |
| II. Background   |                         |
|  | 25)                     |
|  | Frag- 25                |
| mentary TALENT photography of July 1959 reveals no activity that   | at can                  |
| be associated with missiles, but does provide further evidence   | 25)                     |
| in the Kyshtym area.   | 25)                     |
|  | 25)                     |
|  |                         |
|  |                         |
|  |                         |
|  |                         |
|  |                         |
|  |                         |
|  |                         |
|  |                         |

<sup>\*</sup>Three members voted "doubtful" on ICBM, two members voted "negative" on ICBM.

K-18


1 Sep 60

NO

DATE:

LOCATION: Khyrov

COORD : 49 32N - 22 51E (City)



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T0-   | 4757A000100010001-7 | 25X         |
|---|---------------------|-------------|
|   | SH-0288/60<br>K-18  | 6           |
| I. Conclusions  |                     |             |
| Khyrov is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area.  It is an <u>undetermined MRBM</u> area.                         |                     |             |
| II. Background  |                     | 05)/4       |
|   |                     | 25X1        |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |
| There is no collateral information on Khyrov. dated July 1956 reveals no unusual activity in this area. | Photography         |             |
|   |                     | 25 <b>X</b> |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |
|   |                     |             |

LOCATION: Luginy


: 51 05N - 28 24E (City)

WAC : 233

COORD

NO : L-1

DATE: 1 Sep 60



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 |     |  | 25X1          |
|---|-----|--|---------------|
|   |     | SH-0288/60<br>L-1  |               |
|   | I.  | Conclusions  |               |
|   |     | Luginy is an <u>undetermined* ICBM</u> area.  It is an <u>undetermined* MRBM</u> area. |               |
|   | II. | Background   |               |
|   |     |  |               |
|   |     |  |               |
|   |     |  |               |
|   |     |  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |     |  |               |
|   |     |  |               |
|   |     |  |               |
|   |     |  |               |
|   |     |  |               |

- 2 -

<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "undetermined," one member voted "negative."

25X1


SH-0288/60 No Pages 4


LOCATION: L'vov

: 49 50N - 24 00E (City)

NO : L-2

COORD WAC : 232 DATE: 1 Sep 60






LOCATION: Malaya Sazanka


NO : M-1

COORD

: 51 15N - 128 00E (Installation)

DATE: 1 Sep 60







LOCATION: Medved!

: 58 18N - 30 31E (City) COORD

WAC 153 NO M-2DATE: 1 Sep 60



SH-0288/60 M-2



SECURED MILITARY INSTALLATION AT MEDVED' (M-2).

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10: CIA-RDP78T0475 | 57A000100010001-7 |
|--|-------------------|
| IOP SECRET   |                   |

SH-0288/60

M-2

### I. Conclusions

Medved' is a negative  $\overline{ICBM}$  area. It is an undetermined  $\overline{MRBM}$  area.

It is believed to be the location of a unit previously associated with short range rockets.

| II. Background |               |
|----------------|---------------|
|                | 25 <b>X</b> ′ |
|                |               |
|                |               |
|                |               |
|                |               |
|                |               |
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|                |               |
|                |               |
|                |               |
|                |               |

TALENT photography dated July 1956 identifies a secured military installation (58 18 30N - 30 30 40E) at Medved'. The installation, secured by fence and guard towers, contains eight U-shaped barracks-type buildings, two new L-shaped vehicle sheds with large concrete hardstands, and numerous other miscellaneous

- 3 -


TOP SECRET

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7  | ,<br>⊸ 125X1  |
|--|---------------|
| SH-0288/60<br>M-2  |               |
| buildings. The Sol'tsy Airfield, which has an associated M-type Special Weapons Storage site, is located 12 nm southwest of Medved'. |               |
|  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|  |               |
|  |               |
|  |               |
|  |               |
|  |               |
|  |               |
|  |               |

LOCATION: Mozhaysk NO : M-3

COORD : 55 25N - 35 42E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC




SH-0288/60 M-3



MOZHAYSK INSTALLATION. Date of photography,

25X1

- 2 -





No Pages 4

SH-0288/60

LOCATION: Mukachevo NO: M-4

COORD : 48 27N - 22 43E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60





NO

DATE:


M-5

1 Sep 60

LOCATION: Murmansk

: 68 58N - 33 05E (City)

WAC : 51



| TOP SECRET   | SH-0288/60<br>M-5 | 25X1<br>25X1  |
|--|-------------------|---------------|
| I. Conclusions   |                   |               |
| The Murmansk area is a doubtful* ICBM area.  It is a doubtful** MRBM area.                         |                   |               |
| II. Background   |                   |               |
|  |                   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   | _ =           |
| TALENT coverage of did not residue.  | eveal any         | 25X1          |
|  |                   | 25X1          |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
|  |                   |               |
| *Three members voted "doubtful" ICBM, one member voted "negative" ICBM.                            | oted "possible"   |               |
| **Three members voted "doubtful" MRBM, one member "undetermined" MRBM, and one member voted "negat |                   |               |





LOCATION: Nizhnyaya Salda

: 58 10 10N - 60 55 40E (Installation)

NO : N-1 DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 156






LOCATION: Nizhnyaya Tura


: 58 37N - 59 49E (City)

WAC : 156

COORD

NO: N-2 DATE: 1 Sep 60





NO : N-3 DATE: 1 Sep 60

(Location N-3 not assigned)

: N-4

DATE: 1 Sep 60

NO

LOCATION: Novolitovsk

: 42 55N - 132 48E (City)

WAC : 291

133° 30' NOVONEZHINO FROLOVKA SUCHAN A NOVOLITOVSK SEA OF JAPAN CIA/PIC G-8500 NAUTICAL MILES

TOP SECRET


SH-0288/60 N-4 ·25X1

(Novolitovsk has been associated with a missile division head-quarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analysis of the Spassk-Dal'niy area  $/\overline{\text{L}}$  ocation S-14/ for specific information related to this site.)

LOCATION: Olen'ya

WAC 51

NO 0 - 1COORD 68 14N - 33 55E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60



TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 O-1



25X1

- 2 -

|                |                         |                                   |                           |                         |                          | 00100010001-7<br>0-1 |
|----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| I. <u>Co</u>   | nclusions               |                                   |                           |                         |                          |                      |
|                |                         | 'ya installa<br>gative <u>MRB</u> |                           | egative IC              | BM site.                 |                      |
| II. <u>B</u> a | ckground                |                                   |                           |                         |                          |                      |
|                |                         |                                   |                           |                         |                          |                      |
|                |                         |                                   |                           |                         |                          |                      |
|                | The Oleni               | va site app                       | ears on go                | od quality              | extreme-                 | oblique              |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O                       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not<br>tion, with | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | enclosed apparently  |
| with a f       | T photogramence and was | phy of 13 O<br>as in an ear       | ctober 195<br>rly stage o | 7. The si<br>f construc | te was not               | apparently           |



TOP SECRET

LOCATION: Paplaka

NO : P-1

COORD :


: 56 26 N - 21 27E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

No Pages 4

WAC

152



|   |                                   | SH-0288/60<br>P-1 |
|---|-----------------------------------|-------------------|
| I. Conclusions                                  |                                   |                   |
| Paplaka is a <u>n</u><br>It is a <u>probabl</u> | egative ICBM site.  e* MRBM site. |                   |
| II. Background                                  |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   | 2                 |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |
|   |                                   |                   |

- 2 -

<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "probable" on MRBM, one member voted "possible" on MRBM.

|  | TOP SECRET  |  |
|--|---|--|
|  |   | SH-0288/60<br>P-1  |
|  |   |  |
|  |   |  |
|  |   |  |
|  |   |  |
|  |   |  |
|  |   |  |
|  | NT photography dated  | reveals an installation  |
|  |   |  |
| installation apperent wooded area, a   | 6 27 20N - 21 26 50E, far out on the ears to be a military facility control recreational area, a troop training a trenches, and a driver training a | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with                                 |
| installation apper<br>wooded area, a<br>revetments and                               | ears to be a military facility controls recreational area, a troop training trenches, and a driver training a                                       | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with<br>rea.                         |
| installation apper<br>wooded area, a<br>revetments and<br>The Ai<br>the AMS map list | ears to be a military facility cont<br>recreational area, a troop traini  | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with<br>rea.<br>ered as Paplaka, but |
| installation apper<br>wooded area, a<br>revetments and<br>The Ai                     | ears to be a military facility control recreational area, a troop training trenches, and a driver training a rarget Chart lists the area cover.     | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with<br>rea.<br>ered as Paplaka, but |
| installation apper<br>wooded area, a<br>revetments and<br>The Ai<br>the AMS map list | ears to be a military facility control recreational area, a troop training trenches, and a driver training a rarget Chart lists the area cover.     | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with<br>rea.<br>ered as Paplaka, but |
| installation apper<br>wooded area, a<br>revetments and<br>The Ai<br>the AMS map list | ears to be a military facility control recreational area, a troop training trenches, and a driver training a rarget Chart lists the area cover.     | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with<br>rea.<br>ered as Paplaka, but |
| installation apper<br>wooded area, a<br>revetments and<br>The Ai<br>the AMS map list | ears to be a military facility control recreational area, a troop training trenches, and a driver training a rarget Chart lists the area cover.     | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with<br>rea.<br>ered as Paplaka, but |
| installation apper<br>wooded area, a<br>revetments and<br>The Ai<br>the AMS map list | ears to be a military facility control recreational area, a troop training trenches, and a driver training a rarget Chart lists the area cover.     | aining barracks in a<br>ng area with<br>rea.<br>ered as Paplaka, but |

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60

No Pages 2

25X1


25X1

LOCATION: Piltene

: 57 13N - 21 40E (City)

: 152 WAC

NO : P-2 DATE: 1 Sep 60



TOP SECRET

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7  TOP SECRET  SH-0288/60 | 25X1<br>25X1  |
|---|---------------|
| P-2   |               |
| I. Conclusions  |               |
| Piltene is an undetermined* ICBM site.  |               |
| It is an undetermined MRBM* site.   |               |
| II. Background  |               |
| TALENT photography of 1956 shows no unusual activity. Some  |               |
| of the area is obscured by scattered clouds.  | 25X1<br>25X1  |
| identified airfields and missile bases at Tukums, Durbe, Alsunga, Grobina,                              | 23/1          |
| Kurmeni, and Piltene. However, in no case is there supplementary evidence                               |               |
| of any type to verify or deny the existence of missile units in the Piltene area.                       |               |
|   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   |               |

- 2 -

<sup>\*</sup> Four members voted "undetermined," one member voted "doubtful".

: P-3

DATE: 1 Sep 60

NO

LOCATION: Plesetsk


: 62 42N - 40 18E (City)

WAC : 102

COORD

40 30 41° 00' YEMTSA AVDA S SHELEKSA ELEKTROKOMBINAT TIMME SHESTOVO SHELEKSA STATION **GLUBOKOYE** KOCHMAS YAMETSKAYA PUSTYN BOL'SHOYE GRISHINO ♡ PEREKOP PLESTSY PLESHKOVSKAYA VAKHNOVSKAYA **PLESETSK** ZMIYEVO NAVOLOK **PUKSA** OSTROV oksovo ROSLYAKOVO SHUMOVA 10 FEDOVO CIA/PIC G-8487 NAUTICAL MILES

- 1 -




LOCATION: Poltava

49 37N - 34 30E (Airfield)

NO: P-4
DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 234

COORD



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|---|----------------------|
| TOP SECRET  |                      |

SH-0288/60

SH-0288/60 P-4

## I. Conclusions

Poltava Airfield is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.

## II. Background

Poltava Airfield is located 2.5 nm northwest of the city of Poltava. This is a Soviet Long Range Air Force base with an 8,000-foot concrete runway, and a Special Weapons Storage Site located about 3 nm west-northwest of the airfield.

TALENT photography of February 1960 does not indicate any facilities which may be associated with an SSM launching site either on or immediately adjacent to the airfield. There is a new bunker in the weapons storage area which differs considerably from the original bunkers found at Type II Weapons Storage Sites. The new bunker identified at this installation is identical to the new bunker located at Engel's Airfield.

25X1

\_ 25X1




LOCATION: Polyarnyy Ural


COORD : 67 03N - 65 24E (City)

WAC : 94

NO : P-5 DATE: 1 Sep 60



25X1




LOCATION: Podpoloz'ye

COORD : 48 45N - 23 01E (City)

WAC : 232

NO : P-6

DATE: 1 Sep 60






: P-7

NO

LOCATION: Prokhory

: 44 31N - 132 42E (City) COORD DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 282



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-R | RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 |
|--|----------------------------|
| TOP SECRET   | 25X                        |
|  | 25X                        |
|  | SH-0288/60                 |
|  | P-7                        |

(Prokhory has been associated with a missile division head-quarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analysis of the Spassk-Dal'niy area /Location S-14/ for specific information related to this site.)


S-1

LOCATION: Saaremaa Island

COORD : 58 25N - 22 30E (Island)

WAC : 153 DATE: 1 Sep 60

NO




TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60

25X1 25X1



25X1 25X1

| S | anitiz             | ed Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100  TOP SECRET  | 0010001-7             | 25X1          |
|---|--------------------|---|-----------------------|---------------|
|   |                    |   | SH-0288/60<br>S-1     | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   | I.                 | Conclusions   |                       |               |
|   | mis                | Saaremaa Island is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area.  It is a <u>doubtful MRBM</u> area.  It is possible that the activity may be for a shorter-rassile system related to naval activity.  | nge                   |               |
|   | II.                | Background  |                       |               |
|   | at t<br>sou<br>con | TALENT photography of July 1956 shows two track-cetangular clearings, each about 150 by 50 feet, on two of the he end of a rail line which extends out onto a peninsula at the thern tip of Saaremaa Island. At the time of the photograph struction was still under way. Photography of May 1941 sh spur lines were not in existence at that time. | ee spurs<br>ie<br>iy, |               |
|   |                    | •   |                       | 25X1          |
|   |                    |   |                       |               |
|   |                    |   |                       |               |
|   |                    | The security and logistics problems inherent in this cand's location limit the possibility of SSM deployment to Saand.  |                       |               |
|   |                    |   |                       | 25X1          |
|   |                    |   |                       |               |
|   |                    |   |                       |               |
|   |                    |   |                       |               |
|   |                    |   |                       |               |

- 3 -



LOCATION: Samland Peninsula


NO : S-2

COORD

: 54 50N - 20 15 E (Peninsula)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 169



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-  | 7<br>25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|---|--------------------|
| I STERE!  | 25X1               |
| SH-0288/60  |                    |
| S-2   |                    |
| I. Conclusions  |                    |
| The Samland Peninsula is a negative ICBM area.  |                    |
| It is a doubtful MRBM area.   |                    |
| It is the location of a confirmed SAM site.   |                    |
| II. Background  |                    |
|   | 25X1               |
|   |                    |
|   |                    |
|   |                    |
|   |                    |
|   |                    |
| Aside from the "lollipop" sites in the area TALENT photography of 1956, although partially cloud covered, revealed no unusual installa- |                    |
| tions.  |                    |
|   | 25X1               |
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| - 2 -   |                    |



LOCATION: Sarny (Includes Klesov, Site K-10)


NO : S-3


COORD

: 51 20N - 26 36E (Sarny)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 233





LOCATION: Sarova

NO : S-4


COORD


: 54 56N - 43 20E (Installation)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC

: 166






LOCATION: Sary Shagan Area

NO : S-5

COORD

: 46 00 - 47 00N, 71 00 - 74 00E (Area)

DATE: 1 Sep 60



SH-0288/60 S-5

### I. Conclusions

The Sary Shagan area is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a negative MRBM area.

The area is primarily an anti-ballistic missile research and development facility.

#### II. Background

This Working Group concurs in the conclusions of the report of the Joint GMAIC/SIC Working Group on "Activities in the Sary Shagan Area USSR," dated July 1960. The major conclusions from this report are reproduced below:

- "1. The activities being conducted in, and apparently planned for, the Sary Shagan Area are definitely associated with the Soviet guided missile/space program.
- "2. The Sary Shagan Area as presently known comprises one of the major Soviet guided missile/space research, development, and test areas, second only in magnitude of facilities to the Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka complex. Extensive cloud cover /on photography/precludes an accurate appraisal of the actual size; some facilities have been probably missed completely. The large construction support areas and the numerous construction activities indicate that the area is still growing.
  - defense research, development, and test center of the USSR, with current activities directed primarily toward the ballistic-missile defense problem. These activities are under the direction of the PVO (Air Defense of the Homeland). Additional current activities most likely include electronics research and development probably for ballistic-missile early warning and also possibly for space tracking, the testing of surface-to-air missile defense systems against high- and low-flying aircraft and possibly aerodynamic missiles, and the actual tracking of Soviet ICBMs and space vehicles launched from Tyura Tam. We see no evidence of ICBM development, testing, production, or deployment activities in the Sary Shagan Area. We believe the tracking instrumentation and communications facilities to be compatible with land recovery of an object from space.

SH-0288/60 S-5

- "4. The ballistic-missile defense problem is the main concern of the Sary Shagan Area at present. The emphasis to date has been on the precision tracking of incoming ballistic missiles probably for acquiring the data necessary to an active ballistic-missile defense system. Some counter-countermeasure developments may be a part of this program. We believe a similar, but possibly less extensive, precision tracking program is being conducted in the Uka/Peschanyj area of Kamchatka Peninsula against ICBMs, probably as a follow-on, complementary part of the overall Soviet ballistic-missile defense program.
- developed in the Sary Shagan Area. We believe that missiles have been fired from the Sary Shagan Area; however, we doubt that any of these firings have been conducted with the actual complete Soviet anti-ballistic-missile missile system, or that these firings have been conducted against incoming ballistic missiles. The missiles fired to date from the Sary Shagan Area probably have been surface-to-air missiles of the SA-2 type fired from the hexagon site in Zone A, and/or possibly test vehicles representing an early anti-ballistic-missile missile prototype or vehicles carrying components of the anti-ballistic-missile missile system fired from Zone B. The major anti-ballistic-missile missile flight test program has not yet begun (as of from the status of the facilities and the construction activities, we would not expect to see this flight test program for at least another three to six months.
- "6. We have no evidence of missile firings from the vicinity of the ICBM impact area on Kamchatka Peninsula. We believe that the majority of the Soviet anti-ballistic-missile missile flight testing will be conducted initially in the Sary Shagan Area against intermediate- and shorter-range ballistic missiles. However, we would expect to see live firings from Kamchatka against ICBMs shortly after the system is "proven out" at Sary Shagan.
- "7. The future roles of the Sary Shagan Area in the Soviet missile/space program are clearly ones of increasing importance and priority. In addition to the primary anti-ballistic-missile missile development and flight test programs, we expect to see an expansion of the air/missile defense center concept to permit actual testing of an integrated active defensive system against a simulated "attack" involving ballistic missiles, aerodynamic missiles, and high- and low-flying aircraft. We further believe that research and development work on advanced

SH-0288/60 S-5

electronic detection and tracking systems will be continued and probably expanded; the first evidence of possible Soviet "breakthrough" in these fields would probably originate in the Sary Shagan Area. We consider the Sary Shagan Area to be the most likely control area for land recovery of objects from space. The Sary Shagan Area will probably also be the locale for the initial development and testing of the Soviet antisatellite missile program. The amount and type of facilities and activities we see being conducted in, and apparently planned for, the Sary Shagan Area are believed to be compatible with these likely future roles."


25X1

- 4 -




LOCATION: Semipalatinsk (Rail Spur) NO : S-6

COORD : 50 35N - 79 23E (Rail Spur) DATE: 1 Sep 60



SH-0288/60 S-6



- 2 -

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SH-0288/60 S-6

## I. Conclusions

The rail spur near Semipalatinsk is a  $\underline{\text{negative}}$   $\underline{\text{ICBM}}$  site. It is a negative MRBM site.

# II. Background


| TALENT photography of August 1957 shows a rail spur at a point about 36 nm west-northwest of Semipalatinsk. It is located on the newly-constructed rail line that follows the south side of the Irtysh River between Semipalatinsk and Chagan. In the same locality there are two  |               |
|--|---------------|
| 40-foot towers, spaced about three miles apart and approximately in alignment with the 60 nautical miles farther west. The rail spur swings south from the main line in a "U" configuration; a second spur branches from the main spur and parallels it for some distance. The only structures along the spur  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| tracks are two probable earth walls or bunkers, one on each side of the track near the junction of the two spurs. No security measures, such as fencing, were apparent at the time of photography, and no support facility is evident in the vicinity. TALENT photography of again covered the rail spur, but the facility was snow-covered and appeared to be inactive. | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|  | 25X1          |
|  |               |

- 3 -

LOCATION: Sevastopol' NO : S-7


COORD : 44 36N - 33 40E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 250



TOP SECRET

SH-0288/60 S-7



POSSIBLE MISSILE-ASSOCIATED FACILITY NEAR SEVASTOPOL' (5-7).

SH-0288/60 S-7

### I. Conclusions

The Sevastopol' installation is a negative ICBM site.

It is a negative MRBM site.

It is probably a support facility associated with naval shiplaunched missiles.

### II. Background

TALENT photography of \_\_\_\_\_\_ revealed a possible missile-associated facility approximately 3.5 nm east of Sevastopol'. On 1956 TALENT photography, the installation appeared to be nonexistent; however, there was evidence that some construction work was possibly being initiated at that time. Photographic coverage in 1957 revealed that some facilities had been constructed at this location.

The 1960 photography revealed an expanded road-served support facility containing a storage and assembly area, a possible checkout area, and an unidentified area, each secured by a double wire fence and guard towers. In addition, there are two possible storage areas, each secured by a single wire fence, an area of unidentified activity, and a possible housing area. Facilities at two of these areas - the storage and assembly area and the possible checkout area - are somewhat similar to areas found at KYMTR, and therefore, are suggestive of missile-related activities.


The facility is located in the Sevastopol' area and does not appear to be related to other facilities in the area. It is probably a support facility for the four guided missile destroyers operating out of Sevastopol'.



S-8 NO LOCATION: Shepetovka

1 Sep 60 : 50 11N - 27 04E (City) DATE: COORD


WAC : 233





LOCATION: Shikhany NO: S-9

COORD : 52 07N - 47 13E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60






LOCATION: Suchan

COORD : 43 07N - 133 05E (City)

WAC : 291

NO : S-10 DATE: 1 Sep 60






LOCATION: Slavyanka

: 42 51N - 131 21E (City)

WAC : 291

COORD

NO : S-11 DATE: 1 Sep 60




| Carmazo   | TOP SECRE  |                  | SH-0288/60<br>S-11   | (25) |
|-----------|--|------------------|--|------|
| I. Con    | clusions   |                  |  |      |
|           | Slavyanka is a negative It is a doubtful $\overline{MRBM}$ at It is a possible SAM sit | rea.             |  |      |
|           |  |                  |  |      |
|           |  |                  |  |      |
|           |  |                  |  |      |
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|           |  |                  |  |      |
|           |  |                  |  |      |
| scale, di | SENSINT photography of reported missile sitestortion, and snow coverpretation.         | es; however, the | revealed no concrete poor quality, small aphy precluded any defin- |      |
|           |  |                  |  | 25)  |
|           |  |                  |  |      |
|           |  |                  |  |      |
|           |  | · • (. •         |  |      |



LOCATION: Slitere NO : S-12

COORD : 57 38N - 22 18E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60



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|---|-----------------|
| SH-0288/60<br>S-12  |                 |
| I. Conclusions  |                 |
| Slitere is an undetermined ICBM site. It is an undetermined MRBM site.  |                 |
| II. Background  |                 |
| TALENT photography of 1956 shows a probable coastal defense site located 8 nm west of Slitere. It consists of four conical-shaped |                 |
| mounds, with unidentified objects within, oriented on a line parallel to the coastline.   | 25              |
|   |                 |
|   | 25X1            |
|   |                 |
|   |                 |

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25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 No Pages 4


LOCATION: Sovetsk (Tilsit)

NO : S-13

COORD

: 55 05N - 21 54E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7                                 |                    |               |  |
|---|--------------------|---------------|--|
|   | SH-0288/60<br>S-13 | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |
|   |                    |               |  |
| I. Conclusions  |                    |               |  |
| Sovetsk (Tilsit) is a <u>negative</u> <u>ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>doubtful</u> <u>MRBM</u> site.              |                    |               |  |
| II. Background  |                    |               |  |
| Sovetsk is believed to be associated with missile ac Taurage (see T-3), although in a support capacity. There a |                    |               |  |
|   |                    | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |
| TALENT photography of 1956  | , which was        | 25X1          |  |
| heavily cloud-covered, showed no unusual activity.  |                    | 25X1          |  |
|   |                    |               |  |
|   |                    |               |  |
|   |                    |               |  |
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
LOCATION: Spassk-Dal'niy

NO : S-14

COORD

: 44 37N - 132 48E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release | 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A0 | 00100010001-7      | 25X1     |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|----------|
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|                                     |                                | SH-0288/60<br>S-14 | <b>A</b> |

### I. Conclusions

The Spassk-Dal'niy area is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a probable\* MRBM area.

SENSINT photography of December 1956 revealed a military complex at Yekaterinovka. The single military garrison-type area consists of 111 buildings for billeting, storage and administration. Other significant areas include: a probable ammunition storage area consisting

- 2 -

<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "probable" on MRBM, one member voted "possible" on MRBM.

SH-0288/60 S-14

of 175 acres of cleared, fenced land containing four revetted warehouse-type buildings; a storage area with approximately 25 permanent-type buildings; and, a possible radar site. This area is served by Unashi Airfield.

Photography of the same date covering Grodekovo showed 12 military installations in the area. One installation appeared inactive and three others were covered by small scale oblique photography which precluded interpretation. The other installations contained vehicles, possible tanks and artillery pieces, and were used for miscellaneous storage and barracks areas. Several training areas were located throughout the area.

Photography also revealed a probable military installation located northwest of Suchan, containing 45 buildings of various types and approximately 60 unidentified objects, possibly vehicles. This installation is served by Nikolayevka Airfield, just to the southeast. A probable ammunition storage area is located 2.5 nm northeast of the airfield.

TOP SECRET




LOCATION: Stalinabad


: 38 33N - 68 41E (Installation)

NO : S-15 DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 336

COORD






LOCATION: Sudak

NO : S-16

COORD

: 44 51N - 34 58E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60




| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 | - 25X1<br>25X1 |
|---|----------------|
| SH-0288/60<br>S-16  |                |
| I. Conclusions  |                |
| Sudak is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> site.       |                |
|   | 25X1           |
|   |                |
| and TALENT photography of July 1957 revealed no                                 | 25 <b>X</b> 1  |
| unusual installations.  |                |
|   | <b>∼</b> .     |
|   |                |
|   | 25X1           |
|   | 120/(1         |
|   |                |

LOCATION: Surovatikha NO : S-17

COORD : 55 45N - 43 56E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 232



TOP SECRET

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 | • | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|---|---|---------------|
|---|---|---------------|

## I. Conclusions

Surovatikha is an <u>undetermined</u> <u>ICBM</u> area. It is a negative MRBM area.

|    | It is a negative MKDM area. |
|----|-----------------------------|
| н. | Background                  |
|    |                             |
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Far oblique TALENT photographic coverage of February 1960 does not reveal any evidence of a missile site or of possible missile site construction in the Surovatikha area. Photography does reveal a secured storage installation 3 nm southwest of Surovatikha and 23 nm northnortheast of Arzamas, at 55 44N - 43 53E. The installation is served by two spurs from the Gorki-Arzamas railroad. Covering approximately 700 acres, the installation appears to be divided into two areas: a storage area, and a maintenance/support area. Trees in the installation and the

25X1

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|---------------------|---|--------------------|-----|
| •                   |   | SH-0288/60<br>S-17 |     |
| <del>-</del>        | photography hinder the identification, of other buildings and items of interest |                    |     |
|                     |   | <u>*</u>           | 25X |
|                     |   |                    |     |
|                     |   |                    |     |
|                     |   |                    |     |

LOCATION: Svalyava


NO : S-18


COORD

: 48 33N - 22 59E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 232





LOCATION: Tallinn


NO : T-1

COORD

: 59 26N - 24 45E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 153




|             | itized Copy A |   |                       |               |                    |                  | 25X |
|-------------|---------------|---|-----------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------|-----|
|             |               |   |                       |               | SH-0<br>T-1        | 0288/60          |     |
|             |               |   |                       |               |                    |                  |     |
| I. <u>C</u> | onclusions    |   |                       |               |                    |                  |     |
|             |               | s a <u>negative</u>                             |                       |               |                    |                  |     |
|             |               | oubtful MRBN<br>onfirmed SAN                    | -                     |               |                    |                  |     |
|             |               |   |                       |               |                    |                  | 25) |
|             |               |   |                       |               |                    |                  | 207 |
|             |               |   |                       |               |                    |                  |     |
|             |               |   |                       |               |                    |                  |     |
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|             |               |   |                       |               |                    |                  |     |
|             | m a r rante   | 1 l   | - of 1054             | f foi         | idea lined Alban e | and the state of |     |
|             | en Tallinn a  | ' photography<br>nd Khaapsalu<br>al activity wa | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  |     |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |
|             | en Tallinn a  | nd Khaapsalu                                    | ı was only <b>p</b> a | artially cove |                    |                  | 25X |

- 2 -

LOCATION: Tashara NO

: T-2 COORD : 55 32N - 83 31E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 162



**TOP SECRET** 




FIGURE 1. CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY AT TASHARA (T-2).

## I. Conclusions

Tashara is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.

## II. Background

TALENT photography of August 1957 revealed a branch rail line under construction to a point near the Ob' River at Tashara. Along the bank of the river, approximately 3,200 feet north from the end of the railroad bed, an irregularly-shaped area of approximately 35 acres had been recently cleared of trees and brush.

The Soviet press on 8 September 1956 reported that the largest timber transloading combine in Siberia was being built at the village of Tashara, on the bank of the Ob' River. However, construction of the branch rail line and associated facilities shown on August 1957 photography was not sufficiently advanced to permit their identification as a timber transloading combine.

| umber transfeading combine. |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
|                             | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
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FIGURE 2. CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY AT TASHARA (T-2). Date of photography,

25X1

TOP SECRET

No Pages 10

1 Sep 60

T-3

NO

DATE:

25X1 25X1

LOCATION: Taurage Area, bounded by:

Sillale

(55 29N - 22 12E)

Skaudvile (55 25N - 22 37E) Jurbarkas (55 04N - 22 46E)


Sovetsk (55 05N - 21 53E)

COORD

: 55 15N - 22 17E (Taurage)

WAC

: 168




| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A00010001000   | 01-7<br>• 25X<br>• 25X |
|--|------------------------|
| SH-0288/60<br>T-3  |                        |
| I. Conclusions   |                        |
| This location is a <u>doubtful</u> * <u>ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>probable MRBM launch area with support facilities</u> . |                        |
|  | 25X1                   |
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Poor resolution and obliquity of 1956 TALENT photography preclude detailed interpretation in the area. No unusual activity was apparent on the photography. CIA and Army have detailed draft reports of this area.



- 2 -


<sup>\*</sup>Four members voted "doubtful" on ICBM, one member voted "negative" on ICBM.




LOCATION: Tiksi NO: T-4

COORD : 71 36N - 128 48E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 68






NO : T-5LOCATION: Tomsk DATE: 1 Sep 60

: 56 30N - 84 58E (City) COORD


WAC : 158



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25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 T-5



CONVENTIONAL LOGGING OPERATION NORTH OF TOMSK (T-5). Date of photography,

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

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25X1

25X1


| anitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757  | A000 1000 1000 1-7              | 25 |
|--|---------------------------------|----|
|  | SH-0288/60<br>T-5               | 25 |
| I. Conclusions   |                                 |    |
| Tomsk is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area.  It is a negative MRBM area.   |                                 |    |
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| TALENT photography in August 1957 revealed (57 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facili since been identified as the site of a conventional loggin sisted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area again north of Tomsk. | ty, which has g operation, con- |    |
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- 3 -

LOCATION: Tuapse NO : T-6

COORD : 44 05N - 39 06E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 249



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7  TOP SECRET | 14 | 25 |
|---|----|----|
| SH-0288/60<br>T-6   |    | •  |
| Conclusions   |    |    |
| The Tuapse area is a negative ICBM area.  |    |    |

I.

It is a negative MRBM area. 25X1 25X1

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

: T-7


DATE: 1 Sep 60

NO

LOCATION: Tukums

COORD 56 58N - 23 10E (City)

WAC 153



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP76 TOP SECRET                                | SH-0288/60<br>T-7 | 25X1<br>25X1 |
|--|-------------------|--------------|
| I. Conclusions   |                   |              |
| Tukums is a <u>doubtful ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>doubtful MRBM</u> site.                           |                   |              |
|  |                   | 25X1         |
| TALENT photographic coverage of July 1956 showed missile sites or unusual installations in the area. | no evidence of    |              |
|  |                   | 25X1         |


LOCATION: Tyura Tam NO : T-8

COORD : 45 55N - 63 18E (Launch Area "A") DATE: 1 Sep 60

46 01N - 63 33E (Launch Area "B")

45 58 00N - 63 39 40E (Launch Area "C")

WAC : 246



TOP SECRET

25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 T-8




FIGURE 1. TYURA TAM MISSILE LAUNCHING COMPLEX. Green denotes additions since July 1959, which include Launch Area "C" under construction. The complex was largely cloud-covered on April 1960 photography.



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25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 T-8




FIGURE 2. LAUNCH AREA "A" AT TYURA TAM (T-8). Date of photography

25X1




|                           | se 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757/<br>♪ほℂҜピ∥<br>               | 2               |
|---------------------------|--|-----------------|
|                           |  | SH-0288/6       |
|                           |  | T-8             |
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| Comparative TAL           | ENT photography during 1957                                  | 7-60 shows con- |
|                           | ich and instrumentation facili                               |                 |
|                           | one completed rail-served la                                 |                 |
|                           | 57 photography. In 1959 a se<br>n area "B") was under constr |                 |
| mately 10 pm east-northea | st of launch area "A". A this                                | rd launch area  |
|                           | s sophisticated design, was u                                |                 |
|                           | outheast of launch area "B" i                                |                 |
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25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 T-8



25X1

FIGURE 3. LAUNCH AREA "B" AT TYURA TAM (T-8). Date of photography,

- 6 -

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 | 25X1  |
|---|-------|
| · IOP SECKEI  | 23X I |
|   | 25X1  |
| SH-0288/60  |       |
| T-8   |       |

Launch area "A" is believed to function as follows:

- l. Arrival and Erection of the Missile A completely assembled missile, less nose cone, is brought onto the launch platform, probably via the rail spur which bisects the servicing tower tracks. The 25X1 nose cone is probably checked out independently of the missile and mated to the missile assembly on the launching pad prior to erection. The complete missile is subsequently erected in some undetermined manner to rest in a vertical position within the framework of the servicing tower.
- 2. Method of Launch The technique for fueling and launching of the missile cannot be determined. The photographic evidence does not support an underground or in-silo launch capability. Two supporting pillars have been identified, which suggest that the area underneath the platform is generally open. At least eight observation stations are positioned along the pit rim around the launch structure. These would most likely be used to observe exhaust flames during firing, which would require the area underneath the platform to be generally open and clear. The requirement for the large pit, coupled with the requirement for large amounts of water, also suggests that static tests are performed. This is inconsistent with the characteristics of an in-silo launch facility.
- 3. Probable Liquid Propellant Handling Facility The open-sided, rail-served structure, located near the launch platform, is probably associated with liquid propellant handling. A probable tank car, parked on the spur servicing this structure, is photographic evidence which supports this contention.

April 1960 photography revealed a third launch site (area "C") under construction. This site probably contains two launch pads in the early stages of construction. Construction appears to be 20 to 50 percent complete. Photography shows the site to be served by rail and road. Present evidence indicates that the two pads themselves will be roadserved.

The launch pads at launch area "C" are unsophisticated, and do not resemble the elaborate R&D pads at launch areas "A" and "B". Further, there is no evidence of hardened or underground site characteristics at launch area "C". It is estimated that construction could be completed by January 1961.

The installation at launch area "C" could be used as an opera-

- 7 -

25X1 25X1

SH-0288/60 T-8




FIGURE 4. LAUNCH AREA "C" AT TYURA TAM (T-8).

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7                 | 25X1<br>25X1 |
|---|--------------|
| SH-0288/60<br>T-8   |              |
| tional prototype site for the current ICBM, or as an $R\&D$ facility for a new-generation ICBM. |              |
|   | 25X1         |
|   |              |
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|   |              |





FIGURE 5. LAUNCH AREA "C" AT TYURA TAM (T-8). Date of photography,

25X1

TOP SECRET


- 9 -




LOCATION: Ugol'nyye Kopi

: 64 44N - 177 42E (City) COORD

WAC 75 NO U-1 DATE: I Sep 60






| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7  | ≈ 25X1        |
|--|---------------|
| SH-0288/60<br>U-1  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|  |               |
| The Ugol'nyye Kopi installation (64 46 30N - 177 51 00E) was covered by far-oblique WINDFALL photography of 1956. Though the poor quality of the photography limited interpretation, two large excavations or  |               |
| tunnel openings and an adjacent support area were discernible. Far- oblique WINDFALL photography of revealed no facilities in the Anadyr/Leninka area which could be related to SSM launching activity, and the Ugol'nyye Kopi installation itself was partially masked by hills | 25X1          |
| and clouds.  | 7             |
|  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
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25X1



LOCATION: Ukraina NO: U-2

COORD : 51 10N - 128 26E (Airfield) DATE: 1 Sep 60



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| TOP SECRET                              |  |

25X1

SH-0288/60 U-2

### I. Conclusions

Ukraina Airfield is a negative  $\overline{\text{ICBM}}$  site. It is a negative MRBM site.

### II. Background

Ukraina Airfield is located in the Soviet Far East, approximately 15 nm southeast of the city of Svobodnyy. This is a Soviet Long Range Air Force base with a Type II Special Weapons Site located about 4 nm southwest of the airfield. Photography of March 1958 does not reveal any facilities which can be associated with an SSM launching site either on or adjacent to the airfield. The construction of a storage bunker, or bunkers, at the Special Weapons Site had not been started at the time of photography, though other facilities of the site were essentially completed.

25X1

- 2 -


LOCATION: Uman'


NO : U-3

COORD : 48 45N - 30 13E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 233






LOCATION: Ust'-Ukhta


NO : U-4

COORD

: 63 38N - 53 52E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60






: U-5


DATE: 1 Sep 60

NO

LOCATION: Uzhgorod

COORD : 48 37N - 22 18E (City)







: V-1


NO

LOCATION: Valday


: 57 58N - 33 02E (Installation)

WAC

DATE: 1 Sep 60 COORD 154 33° 001



TOP SECRET





No Pages 4

LOCATION: Verkhnyaya Salda

: 58 02N - 60 33E (City) COORD

WAC : 156 NO V-2DATE: 1 Sep 60





SH-0288/60

No Pages 2


LOCATION: Vinnitsa

NO : V-3

COORD

: 49 14N - 28 29E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60





LOCATION: Vladivostok

: 43 08N - 131 54E (City)

WAC : 291

COORD

NO : V-4 DATE: 1 Sep 60

O A/F **SHKOTOVO** OKEANSKAYA AMURSKIY BAY VLADIVOSTOCK PETROVKA USSURIYSKIY BAY 43° 00' PETRA VELIKOGO BAY ASKOL'D ISLAND NAUTICAL MILES CIA/PIC G-8422

| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78  | T04757A000100010001-7 25X1 |
|---|----------------------------|
|   | SH-0288/60<br>V-4          |
| I. Conclusions  |                            |
| The Vladivostok area is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area.  |                            |
|   | 25X1                       |
|   |                            |
|   |                            |
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|   |                            |
|   |                            |
| WINDFALL photography of the Vladivostok are revealed only one installation of particular interest includes a possible inclined ramp and may be associated missiles. | st. The installation 25X1  |
|   | 25X1                       |
|   |                            |
|   |                            |


LOCATION: Volkovysk

NO : V-5

COORD

: 53 10N - 24 28E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60




| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 207               | 11/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 2 |
|---|---|
|   | SH-0288/60<br>V-5                           |
| I. Conclusions  |   |
| Volkovysk is an undeterming It is an undetermined MRB | med ICBM area. M area.                      |
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|   |   |
| TALENT photography of Ju in the Volkovysk area.       | ly 1956 revealed no unusual activity        |
|   | 2   |
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: V-6 LOCATION: Volovets NO

: 48 43N - 23 11E (City) DATE: 1 Sep 60 COORD

WAC : 232





LOCATION: Vinniki


: 49 49N - 24 08E (City)

WAC : 232

COORD

NO : V-7

DATE: 1 Sep 60






: Y-1

NO


LOCATION: Yuryuzan

COORD : 54 47N - 58 33E (Installation) DATE: 1 Sep 60

WAC : 164



TOP SHORET




LOCATION: Yekaterinovka

NO : Y-2

COORD

: 42 55N - 133 03E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60



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SH-0288/60 Y-2



(Yekaterinovka has been associated with a missile division head-quarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analysis of the Spassk-Dal'niy / $\overline{location}$  S-1 $\overline{4/}$  area for specific information related to this site.)

LOCATION: Znamensk (Wehlau)

NO : Z-1


COORD

: 54 37N - 21 13E (City)

DATE: 1 Sep 60


WAC

: 168



| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7   | 25X1<br>25X1  |
|---|---------------|
| I. Conclusions  |               |
| Znamensk is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site.  It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> site.  |               |
| II. Background  |               |
| There are numerous low-level collateral reports, mostly newspaper articles, of missile sites and unidentified military activity in the Znamensk area, but they are of insufficient detail and of dubious credibility. TALENT photography dated reveals a large military camp, which includes an artillery and armored training area, located 1 nm northwest of Znamensk. The photography is of poor quality due to a combination of scattered clouds and poor resolution. | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
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GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

15 September 1960

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Holder of Copy Number . Soviet
Surface-to-Surface Missile Deployment Report
(SH# 0288/60 dtd 1 Septemb r 1960)

At its 6 September 1960 meeting, the USIB approved as modified the recommendations contained in paragraph 4 of the following GMAIC memorandum. The Board Members confirmed or expressed differences in assessments, as reflected in the footnotes, on ICBM sites page 3, and on MRBM sites, page 3 and 4.

- "1. As requested by USIB, GMAIC and its Deployment Working Group evaluated all of the known evidence that may relate to ICBM operational sites. This evaluation also encompassed all locations suspected of being surface-to-surface ballistic sites in the USSR, but not in any of the Satellite countries.
- "2. As a consequence of the increased effort by the member organizations subsequent to the Ad Hoc Study dtd 4 April 1960 (limited in distribution), this new study is quite complete and replaces the site evaluations of its predecessor. Nevertheless, in many "nominated" areas, there is still insufficient evidence to permit an assessment of specific missile relationship and, on others, insufficient evidence to permit unanimity of agreement. GMAIC generally concurs with the Working Group Report.
- "3 The Summary of the findings of the Deployment Working Group, and GMAIC comments thereon, follow:
  - a. 95 of the locations nominated as potentially ballistic missile associated were assessed and written up in full detail. Evidence on 23 other sites was assessed but did not warrant detailed write up.

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# b. ICBM Sites $\frac{1}{2}$ - Working Group Findings

Tyura Tam (T-8)\*

None

Probable
Possible\*\*

Kapustin Yar (K-4)

Plesetsk (P-3)

Polyarnyy Ural (P-5)

Ust'Ukhta (U-4)

Eleven were considered "doubtful", 67 "negative" and 12 "undetermined" as ICBM sites.

GMAIC COMMENTS on ICBM Sites: 2 / 3/

Although Tyura Tam is the R & D test site we believe that with prior planning a few ICBMs could be launched from there during war. A two-pad complex (area C) under construction may be an operational prototype site under construction. KYMTR has never been used for ICBM firings, although two areas (2C and E) are possibly for ICBM training or are adequate for ICBM firings during war. GMAIC questions the likelihood of such use of the KYMTR rather than a site planned and constructed for an operational unit. (It is also likely that at least one of the new areas was constructed to fire the new series of vehicles to approximately 2000 nm).

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<sup>\*</sup> References are to pages in the Working Group Report.

<sup>\*\*</sup> As indicated in the basic study, the majority but not all members of the Working Group evaluated these as "possible". There were major differences on Polyarnyy Ural in particular.

<sup>1 /</sup> See Air Force Footnote on page 6.

<sup>2 /</sup> See Army/Navy Footnote on page 6.

<sup>3 /</sup> See Army Footnote on page 7.

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# c. MRBM Sites - Working Group Findings\*

| Confirmed          | Probable  | Possible        |
|--------------------|---|-----------------|
| Chelkar (C-1)**    | Taurage Area (probably 700 possibly 1100 nm) (T-3)                                  | Balaklava (B-1) |
| Kapustin Yar (K-4) | Paplaka (probably 700 nm) (P-1)   | Karangit (K-5)  |
|                    | Mukachevo Area (range of likely missiles undetermined) (M-4) incl:                  | Khaapsalu (K-7) |
|                    | Pr ipoloziye (P-6)  |                 |
|                    | Svalyava (S-18)   |                 |
|                    | Uzhgorod (U-5)  |                 |
|                    | Volowets (V-6) Spassk Dal'niy Area (probably 700 and/or 1100 nm range) (S-14) incl: | •               |
|                    | Spassk Dal'niy (Div Cmd Hqs   | (S-14)          |
| ,                  | Prokhory (Div Cmd Post) (P-   | 7)              |
|                    | Barano-Orenburgskoye (Regt  | Cmd Hqs)(B-3)   |
|                    | Grodekovo (Rail unloading po  | int) (G-3)      |
|                    | Novolitovsk (Regt Cmd Post)   | (N-4)           |
|                    | Suchan (unkn function) (S-10)   |                 |
|                    | Yekaterinovka (Regt Cmd Pos   | st) (Y - 2)     |

<sup>\*</sup> There was general but not necessarily unanimous agreement on all assessments. See the individual sites for the variations in judgments.

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<sup>\*\*</sup> References are to pages in the Working Group Report.

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# GMAIC COMMENTS on MRBM Sites:

It is noted that KYMTR is an R & D and training facility, but that there are numerous pads, check out facilities and trained crews available to launch missiles of medium range during a war; there are very few targets within range. Chelkar is apparently used for the training of operational crews on missiles launched in conjunction with the antiballistic missile (ABM) program being conducted at Sary Shagan.

Spassk Dal'niy. GMAIC believes the designation Spassk Dal'niy and 6 associated locations as "probable" MRBM sites must recognize that while the 7 locations were identified in CPX exercises as associated with MRBM activity the actual launch sites cannot be specifically located at any one of them or similar locations not yet determined. GMAIC therefore considers that Spassk Dal'niy is a probable deployment area for MRBM. 4

Mukachevo Area. There is evidence from several different sources and of different types that strongly indicates the association of the several locations in the Mukachevo area with the operational or logistic phase of surface-to-surface missiles, although the range of the missiles and the specific missile functions are not so clear. The functions of the 5 places listed are not now known; there may be additional places now unknown in the same general area of similar missile function.

## SUMMARY GMAIC COMMENTS, MRBM Sites:

For the reasons noted above, but without actually differing with the judgments of the Deployment Working Group, GMAIC believes that naming 14 MRBM sites can be misleading. Rather two locations (T-3 and P-1) and two areas should be listed with the understanding that within the areas there would probably be several launching locations.

- "4. GMAIC recommends that:
  - a. USIB note:
    - (1) The Working Group Report, and GMAIC comments thereon.

| 4 / | See | Army | Footnote | on | Page | 7 |  |
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| TOP SECRET  - 5 -  (2) That GMAIC is planning to:  (a) As evidence warrants, modify the assessments contained in the Working Group Report, and add new sites.  (b) Add to the Report additional evaluations of surface-to-surface missiles deployed outside of the USSR proper.  b. USIB approve GMAIC condensing and sanitizing this report to permit dissemination to U.S. personnel abroad  c. A copy of this memorandum and USIB's action thereon be forwarded to the holders of the Working Group Report.  d. This Report be used as a guide to permit concentration of collection effort."                      | 2     |   |
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<sup>\*</sup> Two sanitized versions of the basic report are being prepared which can be disseminated: (a) to U.S. personnel abroad;

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1 / The ACS/I, USAF, believes that this study represents a significant contribution to the intelligence community's appreciation of Soviet missile deployment, however, his analysis of the available evidence leads him to conclude that certain ICBM sites should be evaluated as follows:

| Confirmed | Probable       | Possible                             |
|-----------|----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Tyura Tam | Berezovka      | Dolon                                |
|           | Kapustin Yar   | Mukachevo                            |
|           | Polyarnyy Ural | Murmansk/Olenya Area                 |
|           | Ust Ukhta      | Nizhnaya Tura/Verknaya<br>Salda Area |
|           |                |                                      |

Plesetsk

- The Army and Navy members of GMAIC believe that the significance of the DWG report of 1 September 1960, in view of the completeness of its examination into the available evidence on all suspect locations proposed for consideration, and in view of the absence of increased indications of expanding deployment of Soviet ICBMs during the past five months, lies in the face that this report supports the conclusions of the earlier report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Deployment of April 1960. Those conclusions, which the Ad Hoc Working Group stated were made with a reasonable degree of confidence, and which are reflected in Program "C" of NIE 11-8-60, are:
  - 1. There are probably only a few, if there are any, completed ICBM sites (complexes) or deployed units at the present time.
  - 2. Up to this time, the Soviet site construction program is probably less than the pace of the ICBM military buildup estimated in NIE 11-8-59.
  - 3. The training capability for the ICBM appears to be a limiting factor on deploying operational units at this time.

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- 3 / The Army Member of GMAIC agrees with the Army Working Group Member that Plesetsk, Ust Ukhta, and Polyarnyy Ural should not be considered possible ICBM sites. There is no direct evidence on any of these locations which associate them with the Soviet ICBM deployment program. They are in the sub-Arctic region, an unlikely location for initial deployment of ICBM's. When coupled with the evidence from the Soviet test ranges indicating no ICBM deployment generally, these locations are probably not ICBM launching sites. The evidence available suggests that these locations are associated with early warning and/or other electronic functions.
- 4/ While the Army Member concurs that the Spassk Dal'niy area is a probably SSM deployment area, he agrees with the Army Member of the Working Group that the evidence available does not support a conclusion that 700 or 1100 nm missiles are probably deployed in the area at this time. Further, since the acceptance of Paplaka as missile associated depends heavily on the analysis of the Spassk Dal'niy CPX activity, the Army member does not concur in the findings of "probable" MRBM site for this location.

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